Two things stood out to me while watching City play Tottenham last weekend. One good, one bad. Semenyo’s poor performance in the final third (yes, I know he scored), and Bernardo Silva’s unbelievable work ethic out of possession.
Semenyo Pease Finish!
Yes, Semenyo did score a goal, but I honestly couldn’t care less. What did he do with the other twenty or so opportunities he got?
The graphic below sums it up pretty well.
It shows all of Semenyo’s possessions where he received the ball outside Tottenham’s defensive shape. The defensive shape here is defined as the smallest convex polygon that contains all of the opponent’s players. Why focus only on receptions outside the defensive shape? Because Semenyo was playing as a winger, and when he receives the ball in these situations, we can be fairly confident there is space in front of him to carry, dribble, and penetrate into the final third.
The plot also shows what each possession led to, along with the number of opponents he overtook during that possession.
Two things stand out to me:
To Semenyo’s credit, he exploits the space in front of him.
You can see this from the length of the arrows. They’re long, and they’re mostly directed toward goal, which tells us he’s carrying the ball aggressively and with intent. That’s exactly what you want from a winger in those situations.
The final output is the problem.
Five possessions ended with him losing the ball without even attempting a pass or a shot. Another five ended in unsuccessful passes. That’s ten wasted possessions in promising situations.
Even if just two or three of those had resulted in successful passes, it would have created real problems for the Tottenham defense, especially with Haaland starving for service in the box. And if I’ve learned anything from watching football over the last ten years, it’s that one good chance can completely change the complexion of a game.
Bernardo Can Run!
This shouldn’t surprise anyone. Bernardo Silva has always been one of the hardest-working players off the ball, and a huge reason why Pep trusts him so much. But this game felt different. His pressing was on another level. So much so that it directly led to Tottenham turning the ball over in two extremely dangerous areas and conceding two goals!
The physical data backs this up.
Metric (Per 30 Min Out of Possession)
Rank
Change of Direction (a great proxy for pressing intensity)
1
Distance Covered
1
Running Distance (15 – 20 km/h)
1
High Speed Running Distance (20 – 25 km/h)
1
High Intensity Distance (+20 km/h)
3
High Speed Running Count
3
High Intensity Count
4
For a 31-year-old with six Premier League titles to put up this kind of off-ball physical performance tells you everything you need to know about his mentality and his desire to win the ball back.
Final Thoughts
I don’t have any hate for Semenyo. I genuinely believe this was an off day. City played a very good game overall, but this is football.
A scrappy first goal from Solanke changed the momentum. An unbelievable second goal followed, and as a fan of the game, all you can do is stand up and applaud.
That’s why I love this sport. You can never take your foot off the gas. Missed chances have a way of coming back to haunt you.
For the first time this year, I saw City look like City again. Playing out from the back. Making runs with purpose. Breaking lines with confidence. It felt like every player knew what the next action was going to be before the ball even arrived.
But that only came in the second half.
The first half was the same version of City we have seen far too often this season. Safe. Hesitant. Stuck in a cocoon. I was lying in bed in the middle of the night, watching one lateral pass after another, waiting for something to happen, and feeling that familiar frustration build with every recycled possession. There was no intent, no risk, and very little freedom.
So what changed after the break?
Pep made three immediate substitutions. Rodri, Gvardiol, and Doku came on for Nico Gonzalez, Nico O’Reilly, and Savinho. Most importantly, it was the first time in a long while that we saw Rodri back on the pitch. Personally, I felt he changed everything.
To test whether that feeling held up beyond the eye test, I turned to SkillCorner Dynamic Events data, specifically the Player Possessions and Passing Options datasets.
First Half vs Second Half
Before diving into individual players, it is worth checking whether the match statistics reflect what I felt while watching.
First Half
Second Half
# Build-Up Possessions
57
81
# Create Possessions
111
97
# Finish Possessions
116
139
Shots
2
12
Manchester City: First Half vs. Second Half Performance
The most obvious difference is the shot volume. City took six times as many shots in the second half. More telling, though, is how those shots were reached. In the first half, City needed 58 finish possessions per shot. In the second half, that number dropped to roughly 12. That alone tells us how much easier it became for City to turn possession into actual chances.
We also see a clear increase in build up possessions after the break, alongside a reduction in create possessions. That combination suggests greater confidence at the back and faster progression through midfield, rather than slow circulation in the middle third. The ball moved more decisively from build up into the final phase, and when City arrived there, they arrived with intent.
This sets the stage for a deeper comparison between Rodri and Nico Gonzalez, two players tasked with the same role but producing very different outcomes in one of the most important positions on the pitch.
Rodri Vs. Nico Gonzalez
I want to begin this comparison in the simplest way possible, by placing the pass maps of Rodri and Nico González side by side, with passes color coded by the type of defensive block they were facing. Even without diving into numbers, a few patterns immediately stand out.
Rodri has more possessions than Nico despite playing the same number of minutes.
Nico has very little presence in the final third.
Rodri plays more line breaking passes.
Finally, Rodri’s average pass length is higher.
Nico Gonzalez
Rodri
Total Possessions
38
58
Possessions in the final third
6
20
Total Line-breaking passes
4
6
Through Line-breaking Passes
2
5
Avg. Pass Length (m)
12.1
13.8
More possessions for Rodri
The most striking difference is simply how often Rodri is involved. Having 52 percent more possessions in the same amount of time is not trivial. It speaks to availability. In fact, Rodri was available as a passing option on 44 percent of possessions, compared to 36 percent for Nico.
Nico’s lack of presence in the final third
Rodri’s dominance in final third possessions jumps off the page, but this is where the context matters. It would be unfair to pin this entirely on Nico.
When Rodri was in possession, the average position of the opposition’s last defender was 14 meters from their own goal. When Nico had the ball, that line sat at 19 meters. In other words, the defensive block was significantly deeper when Rodri was on the pitch. That naturally gave him more freedom to step forward and influence play higher up the pitch.
Line breaking intent and pass length
The final two points, line breaking passes and average pass length, are closely related. Before drawing conclusions about decision making or risk taking, it is important to understand what Rodri and Nico were actually seeing in front of them when they received the ball. That is where the passing options data becomes essential.
Passing Options
We can now go a level deeper by looking at the passing options each player had when they were in possession. To do this, I created two grids. Both grids show the average number of passing options Rodri had relative to Nico per possession, but against two different defensive structures: a medium block and a low block.
A negative value indicates that Rodri had fewer passing options per possession than Nico in that area, while a positive value indicates that he had more.
On their own, these grids are not particularly insightful. The real value comes when they are overlaid with each player’s pass maps against the corresponding defensive block.
Against a medium block
Against a medium block, both players primarily circulated the ball through the central three channels of the middle third. What stands out, however, is that Rodri actually had fewer passing options than Nico in those zones, particularly in the left and right half spaces.
Despite that, Rodri completed three through line breaking passes, highlighted by the thicker arrows. This tells me something important. Rodri was able to identify and execute the correct pass at the correct moment, even in areas where there were not many obvious options available. He progressed the ball by breaking lines rather than relying on volume or safety.
Nico, on the other hand, tended to play more lateral passes into zones where City had multiple players available. Those are areas where Sunderland’s defensive structure was likely already set and comfortable defending. As a result, Nico’s passing felt safer, but also less disruptive.
Against a low block
Against a low block, the picture changes. Rodri clearly had more passing options ahead of him in the central channel than Nico. At the same time, Nico had more options available in the wide areas.
This difference in available options helps explain the passing behaviour we see. Rodri attempted several longer passes into the box, particularly from central areas. Nico, meanwhile, continued to circulate the ball laterally in the middle third. While Nico did play some passes out to the right wing, Rodri did so more consistently, even when his options in that area were limited.
By doing this, Rodri was able to stretch the pitch horizontally, enabling crosses into the box and creating opportunities for underlapping and overlapping runs. This also explains why Rodri’s average pass length was 1.7 meters higher than Nico’s.
Bringing it all together
If there is one statistic that neatly summarizes the difference between the two performances, it is this: Across medium and low blocks combined, Rodri passed to the most threatening available option in 19 out of 40 possessions (47.5%). Nico did so in only 10 out of 32 possessions (31.3%).
For me, that encapsulates the impact Rodri had. It was not just about having more options, or playing longer passes. It was about consistently identifying where the danger was, and having the confidence and clarity to play into it.
This was a close one. Tactically, the script was set from the start. Manchester City did not line up with any traditional wingers, which meant that almost every meaningful chance they created would have to come through the middle of the pitch. Nottingham Forest, on the other hand, clearly did their homework. Out of possession, they defended with great discipline in a 4-5-1, overloading the midfield and staying extremely compact, fully aware that central progression was realistically City’s only route to goal.
Fullback Troubles Without Wingers
City found it relatively easy to circulate the ball to their fullbacks, who were positioned wide and slightly higher than the centre-backs around the halfway line. However, from there, progression almost always stalled. Those areas rarely led to anything threatening.
Ideally, a fullback wants a winger ahead of them; someone to pass to, combine with, and then make overlapping, underlapping, or supporting runs in order to get the ball back and deliver into the box. That dynamic was largely missing. With no traditional winger on the left, O’Reilly often had to wait for Phil Foden to make a run from midfield, and Forest tracked those movements extremely well.
In fact, most of the runs available for O’Reilly were inward, towards the central channel or half-space, rather than down the line. These movements were also almost always isolated. Rarely did we see complementary runs in the same channel to create space or force defensive indecision. As a result, O’Reilly frequently found himself with no clear progressive option.
Although he did find some success connecting with Foden and Reijnders in the left and central half-spaces, neither had their best day from a decision-making or chance-creation standpoint. Too often, those possessions ended with the ball being recycled backwards or lost under pressure.
On the right, Matheus Nunes enjoyed slightly more success finding Bernardo Silva’s runs in the wide channel. However, considering how conservative Bernardo has become over the years (his style now suiting more of a number six than a makeshift winger) those passes rarely amounted to anything. Instead of taking on his defender or delivering early, Bernardo often chose the safer option and played the ball back inside, allowing Forest to reset their block.
It was therefore no surprise to see Savinho, a true winger, introduced in the 73rd minute in place of Reijnders. His presence immediately stretched the pitch and gave Nunes a genuine high-and-wide option on the right. In fact, it was Savinho’s dangerous ball over the back line to Haaland that led to a flurry of corners for City, one of which eventually resulted in Cherki’s goal.
Gvardiol: The New KDB?
I know a lot of people like to say Cherki is the new Kevin De Bruyne, but I want to give a salute to Josko Gvardiol for the role he played in getting City going from the back.
Foden and Cherki are two of the most technically gifted players in the Premier League, particularly when receiving under pressure with their backs to goal. All Gvardiol had to do was find them at the right moment and he did so exceptionally well.
His line-breaking passes through the center were instrumental in injecting tempo into City’s attack. Time and again, he split Forest’s midfield block with precision. One such pass early in the second half, threaded into Cherki as he drifted towards the left side, proved decisive. Cherki quickly released Reijnders on a late run into the box, leading to a sublime finish and City’s opening goal.
The Simplicity of Nottingham Forest
As a City fan, it was incredibly frustrating to watch O’Reilly recycle possession back to Gvardiol and González for what felt like the umpteenth time. But when Nottingham Forest had the ball, they attacked with a very clear plan.
They knew they were not capable of consistently playing through City’s press, and instead leaned into their strengths. Time and again, they went long towards Igor Jesus. My word, what a player he is! He repeatedly received the ball in the central channel just beyond the halfway line, and on a few occasions early in the match even managed to draw fouls, much to the frustration of Rúben Dias.
Forest also relied heavily on quick, early crosses into the box. They attempted ten in total, with six finding their target, and many of them delivered beautifully by Hutchinson. City, by contrast, attempted only three more crosses in the entire match, with just three being accurate, despite completing 272 more passes than Forest.
This isn’t to say City should abandon their principles and resort to aimless crossing. But it does highlight how crossing can still pose a real threat and create simple chances out of almost nothing, especially when you have a physical presence like Erling Haaland constantly occupying the box.
Decision-Making and Chemistry
It’s clear to me that for City to score goals freely, their primary creators—Foden, Cherki, and Reijnders—need to develop a near-telepathic understanding with Haaland, much like De Bruyne once had. Cherki looks like he’s getting there, but Foden and Reijnders still have work to do.
Too often, City won the ball high up the pitch through their pressing, only to then choose the safe option and play backwards, restarting the entire cycle. At other times, the wrong run was found. Reijnders was dispossessed on multiple occasions while seemingly unsure of his next action, while Foden, frustratingly, appeared reluctant to play Haaland in and instead opted for low-percentage shots. As a matter of fact, Nottingham Forest turned the ball over 27 times in their own half, courtesy of inaccurate passing, while City managed to take only four shots off those chances.
One thing I also noticed was how frequently Foden looked for the one-touch layoff with a number eight or six when receiving with his back to goal. While that has its place, I can’t help but feel he has the ability to show a bit more patience, roll his defender, and thread Haaland through himself.
I understand that chemistry takes time, and I’ve come to accept that replicating the level of cohesion City had in previous seasons may be unrealistic. Watching this team over the past eight years has been a privilege and it still is. Football has changed, and it doesn’t feel quite as rosy anymore. But, that’s the beauty of it!
